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NOTES
FILLING THE VOID IN FIRST AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE: IS THERE A SOLUTION
FOR REPLACING THE IMPOTENT SYSTEM OF
PRIOR RESTRAINTS?
Richard Favata"
INTRODUCTION

"[R]estrictions which could be validly imposed when enforced by
subsequent punishment are, nevertheless, forbidden if attempted by
prior restraint." '
The First Amendment of the Constitution protects a citizen's right
to exercise free speech. The freedom of speech is a coveted right that
Americans exercise daily. As a testament to its importance, the scope
of the right of free speech has continuously been litigated in courts
across the nation.' In certain cases, the government has attempted to
restrict speech using "prior restraints." 3
Prior restraints prohibit speech prior to its publication. 4 Prior
restraints are essentially a means of censorship. Critics have argued
that the government should reserve prior restraints for speech that is
Prior
extremely inflammatory and detrimental to the public.5
restraints on speech may take many forms.6 The earliest form of prior
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Fordham University School of Law. A special thanks to
Professor Andrew Sims for his insight.
1. Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 648, 648 (1955).
2. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989); Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1345 (1st
Cir. 1986); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
4. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714; Near, 283 U.S. at 701-07; Emerson, supra
note 1, at 648; John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 Yale L.J. 409
(1983).
5. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 648; Jeffries, supra note 4, at 412.
6. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 412; Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a
Difference: A Reappraisalof the Doctrineof PriorRestraint,68 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
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restraint originated in England, and was known as administrative

preclearance. 7 Today, court-ordered injunctions are a popular means
of instituting a prior restraint.8 Because the freedom of speech is so
important and prior restraints serve to curtail that right, the courts
have been highly critical of prior restraints.' In the landmark case of
New York Times Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court decided that

an injunction prohibiting the publication of the "Pentagon Papers"

would constitute a prior restraint and was thus impermissible.1" The

Court noted that, "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes
to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional

validity."11
Though courts have undoubtedly maintained a strong animus
toward prior restraints, a corollary to the doctrine has arisen.12 The
corollary is known as the collateral bar rule. The collateral bar rule

dictates that even unconstitutional court orders must be complied with
until amended or vacated.13

Essentially, disobeying a court order,

such as an injunction prohibiting publishing a story, leads to a
contempt charge. 4 Under the collateral bar rule, the charge of
contempt will stand regardless of whether the original court order had
merit. Therefore, a party that fails to abide by the injunction is barred
from challenging the validity of the injunction on the ground that the

court erred in applying the underlying substantive law.15

Because the collateral bar rule is rather harsh and serves as an
impediment to timely publication of speech, an exception has

developed under which "[a] party subject to an order that constitutes
a transparently invalid prior restraint on pure speech may challenge
7. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 412.
8. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714; Near, 283 U.S. at 704-05; Providence
Journal,820 F.2d at 1345; Progressive,467 F. Supp. at 991; see also Jeffries, supra note
4, at 412; see infra Part I.A.3.ii.
9. See, e.g., N.Y Times, 403 U.S. at 714; Near, 283 U.S. at 707-23; Providence
Journal,820 F.2d at 1345; Progressive,467 F. Supp. at 992-94.
10. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
11. Id. (citation omitted).
12. John R.B. Palmer, Note, Collateral Bar Rule and Contempt: Challenging a
Court Order After Disobeying It, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 215 (2002) (providing an
excellent overview of the collateral bar rule and its application to different fields of
law); see also Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); ProvidenceJournal,
820 F.2d at 1345.
13. ProvidenceJournal,820 F.2d at 1345.
14. See Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 539,
552-53 (1977); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First
Amendment, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 281, 311 (2000); John P. Lenich, What's So Special
About Special Proceedings? Making Sense of Nebraska's Final Order Statute, 80 Neb.
L. Rev. 239,252 (2001); see also Walker, 388 U.S. at 315.
15. Conversely, other types of judicial orders may be violated without forfeiting
the right to challenge the validity of the order on the merits. A court ordered
subpoena is an example of such an order.
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the order by violating it."

6

171

Unfortunately, the manner in which the

case law developed in the area of transparently invalid restraints has

caused the collateral bar rule to lose its force in the realm of First
Amendment jurisprudence.17 The Supreme Court has never upheld a
prior restraint on protected pure speech."

As a result, a void has been

created in First Amendment jurisprudence. The courts have not ruled
out the possibility that certain topics, falling within the realm of
protected speech, may need restriction. 9

They are, however,

apparently unwilling to impose restrictions in the form of a prior
restraint.2 ° In today's political climate, certain publications could be

extremely detrimental to the nation's safety."
Therefore, if the
government is committed to the idea of maintaining a mechanism for
restricting speech, the void must be filled by another mechanism for
curtailing speech.

Accordingly, this Note argues that under the present state of First
Amendment jurisprudence, all prior restraints on protected pure
speech could be deemed transparently invalid,22 and consequently can

be violated without
suffering the repercussions associated with the
23

collateral bar rule.
Parts I.A.1 and I.A.2 of this Note examine the history of prior
restraints, both as they developed in England and as they became a
part of the United States' jurisprudence. Moreover, Part I.A.3 details
16. Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1344. The term "pure speech" refers to
printed material and oral speech. See Walker, 388 U.S. at 307; United States v.
Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972); Christine Hasiotis, Constitutional LawTransparently Invalid Order Exception to the Collateral Bar Rule Under the First
Amendment in the Federal Courts-In re Providence Journal Company, 809 F.2d 63
(1st Cir. 1986), 21 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 265, 267 (1987). An injunction issued under a
law that has the pretense of unconstitutionality must still be obeyed until vacated or
modified. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United
Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (holding a court
ordered injunction must be obeyed until amended or vacated); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v.
Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980) (same); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 439 (1976) (same).
17. See infra Part III.A (describing how the case law has developed in such a
manner as to render the collateral bar rule impotent as a tool for restricting pure
speech).
18. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); ProvidenceJournal,820 F.2d at 1345; United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
19. Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1345; see N.Y Times, 403 U.S. at 714; Near,
283 U.S. at 716; Progressive,467 F. Supp. at 996.
20. See N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714; Near, 283 U.S. at 723; ProvidenceJournal,820
F.2d at 1345; Progressive,467 F. Supp. 992-94.
21. See infra Part II.A, detailing two specific instances where publication could
threaten national security, and therefore may warrant restriction.
22. There are exceptions to this rule. Such exceptions include pure speech that is
obscene, as well as speech that infringes upon intellectual property rights. See infra
Part I.B.2.i.
23. See infra Part III.A.
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the different types of prior restraints and the implications each has on
the freedom of speech. Part I.B discusses the collateral bar rule and
its application to the First Amendment. This section details the rule's
origin, reasoning, and application to the First Amendment through an
analysis of Walker v. Birmingham24 and other relevant case law. Part
I.B.2 delineates the exceptions that have developed to the collateral
bar rule, as well as the ways in which the modern prior restraint
doctrine had been applied to issues such as national security. Part
I.C.1 discusses the case of New York Times Co. v. United States and its
holdings, contrasted with25 a scenario arising from the case of United
States v. Progressive,Inc.
Part II details the conflict that has resulted from the development of
the case law and commentary that consistently insist on preserving the
ability to restrict speech should a case arise where it would be in the
This Note details two such scenarios.26
nation's best interest.
However, despite the insistence on maintaining a system of restricting
speech, the government has no legitimate means to do so due to the
development of the relevant case law. Part III features this argument:
the transparently invalid exception to the collateral bar rule has
rendered the doctrine of prior restraints impotent as a mechanism for
restricting speech. Finally, Part III details possible solutions for filling
the void left by the absence of an adequate prior restraint doctrine,
culminating in the conclusion that while the current system is
undoubtedly flawed, it is still the best mechanism for protecting the
nation's safety and its constitutional rights. The nation must therefore
rely on the integrity and judgment of the media to censor the material
that is truly a risk to national security, and the law to police that which
crosses the line dictated by Near v. Minnesota.2
I. RESTRAINTS ON SPEECH

A. The Origins of PriorRestraints
The doctrine of prior restraints traces its ancestry back to English
statutory law, and its development in the United States mirrors the
unwelcomed reception received overseas. This section examines the
history of the doctrine. One of the very first prior restraint cases heard
before the Supreme Court, Near v. Minnesota, will also be discussed.
Finally, the section highlights the four different ways in which speech
can be restricted prior to its dissemination, concentrating on
24.
would
25.
26.
27.

388 U.S. 307 (1967). In Walker, the Court held that the collateral bar rule
apply regardless of whether a prior restraint was unconstitutional.
467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
See infra Part II.A.
283 U.S. 697 (1931); see infra Part I.A.2.
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administrative preclearance and injunctions.
1. English Origins and the First Amendment
The doctrine of prior restraints is rooted in the statutory law of
England. 28 The English Licensing Act of 1662 developed a scheme
requiring the Crown authorize all publications.2 9 The Act afforded
the Crown the opportunity to restrict the publication of materials that
it felt were dangerous to the Crown's interest.3" The statute had a
term of thirty-two years. In 1694, the English Parliament refused the
opportunity to renew the Licensing Act.31 It had become a great
burden, and was thought of as "unwieldy, extreme, and even
ridiculous. 3 2 In due time, the English became accustomed to the
freedoms that the abandonment of the act allowed. Blackstone, one
of the first commentators on prior restraints, declared:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter
when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy
the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own
temerity.34
While Blackstone clearly denounced restriction of speech prior to
publication, he also conceded that the freedom of speech is not totally
unbridled. Blackstone believed in a state's right to punish improper
speech only subsequent to its publication.

28. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 412; William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First
Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of
the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 245, 247-49 (1982) (discussing the
English licensing systems).
29. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 412; see also Emerson, supra note 1, at 651;
Richard J. Vangelisti, Cass Sunstein's "New Deal" For Free Speech: Is It An "UnAmerican" Theory of Speech?, 85 Ky. L. J. 97, 130 (1997).
30. Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against
Expression, 51 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2000).
31. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 412. The act was allowed to expire in large part
due to the difficulties in administrating the statute. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 651;
Donald E. Lively, The Information Superhighway: A First Amendment Road Map, 35
B.C. L. Rev. 1067, 1073 n.52 (1994); Allen M. Shinn, Jr., The First Amendment and the
Export Laws: Free Speech on Scientific and Technical Matters, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
368, 382 n.89 (1990).
32. Emerson, supra note 1, at 651.
33. See Stanley Godofsky & Howard M. Rogatnick, Prior Restraints: The
Pentagon Papers Case Revisited, 18 Cumb. L. Rev. 527, 539 (1988); Jeffries, supra
note 4, at 412.
34. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *152 (Wayne Morrison ed., 2001).
35. See id.; Jeffries, supra note 4, at 413-14.
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From the English tradition, the Founders of this nation crafted the
First Amendment.3 6 It is evident that this Amendment and the
subsequent development of its case law, in which prior restraints
became not only obsolete but also condemned, were a reaction to the
licensing schemes employed by the Crown.37 What is less obvious is
the manner in which the drafters intended to handle the second half of
Blackstone's assertion regarding restraints on speech.3" Because the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Framers' intention has
somewhat wavered, 39 it is unclear whether speech was intended to be
protected from both prior restraints and subsequent punishment by
statute 40 - The current state of the law, however, can best be
summarized as follows: "[T]here is a sense that the Court's current
hostility to laws punishing speech after the fact, while strong,
nevertheless does not rise to the level of its special hostility toward
prior restraints."41
2. Near v. Minnesota
The Supreme Court first took the issue of prior restraints head on
in 1931, in the case of Near v. Minnesota.4 2 The case centered around
a Minnesota statute allowing injunctive relief prohibiting the
publication of a "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper,
The law was couched as a
magazine, or other periodical. ' 43
The controversy
mechanism for eliminating public nuisances.'
surrounding this statute arose when a weekly newspaper stated "a
Jewish gangster was in control of gambling, bootlegging and
racketeering in Minneapolis, and that law enforcing officers and
36. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 12-34, at 1039 (2d ed.
1988); Vangelisti, supra note 29, at 130; see also Shinn, supra note 31, at 382-83.
37. See Tribe, supra note 36, § 12-34, at 1039 (noting that the Founders' rejection
of the English licensing schemes led to the protections offered by the First
Amendment); Shinn, supra note 31, at 382-83; see also Vangelisti, supra note 29, at
130; see generally N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Walker v. City
of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); In re
Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1345 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Free
Speech in the United States 18-20 (1946).
38. See Wells, supra note 30, at 7; see also Jeffries, supra note 4, at 410; Martin H.
Redish, The ProperRole of the PriorRestraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory,
70 Va. L. Rev. 53, 54 (1984); Scordato, supra note 6, at 5.
39. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (suggesting that all laws
restricting speech are unconstitutional). But see Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,
462 (1907) (holding that while prior restraints are unconstitutional, subsequent
punishments may be constitutional if used to protect the public welfare).
40. See Wells, supra note 30, at 7.
41. Id. at 7.
42. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
43. Id. at 702.
44. See Wells, supra note 30, at 8.
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agencies were not energetically performing their duties."4 5 The
government sought to enjoin the newspaper's future publication.
The Supreme Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional.46
The Court reasoned that the statute's purpose "was not
47
punishment... but suppression of the offending newspaper.
Moreover, the Court stated that the statute and the injunction against
the newspaper were akin to censorship because they not only
prevented the newspaper from publishing this article, but all similar
future articles, unless the newspaper could convince a judge of a
publication's good purpose. 8 Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the
Court, renounced the use of prior restraints: "[I]t has been generally,
if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the
guaranty [First Amendment] to prevent previous restraints upon
publication. '49 Though Hughes laid out this very staunch principle, he
was careful to include that prior restraints are not per se
unconstitutional and that there may be instances, though limited,
where they may survive judicial scrutiny.5 0
No one would question but that a government might prevent actual
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing
dates of transports or the number and location of troops. On similar
grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be enforced
against obscene publications. The security of the community life
may be protected against incitements to acts of violence and the
overthrow by force of orderly government. The constitutional
guaranty of free speech does not "protect a man from an injunction
against uttering words that may have all the effect of force."'
Moreover, Hughes dictated that not all subsequent punishments
would withstand judicial scrutiny. 2
45. Near, 283 U.S. at 704.
46. Id. at 697. However, a strong dissent led by Justice Butler argued that the
statute at issue, as applied to the current case, was not unconstitutional. The
dissenters reasoned that, the "constitution was never intended to protect malice,
scandal and defamation when untrue or published with bad motives or without
justifiable ends. It was never the intention of the constitution to afford protection to a
publication devoted to scandal and defamation." Id. at 728-29.
47. Id. at 711.
48. Id. at 712. This restraint relied on a statute that made "malicious, scandalous
and defamatory" speech illegal. Therefore, if the Court had upheld the statute in this
context, any speech that reported official misconduct would have been prohibited.
Thus, the publisher would have been censored in the future.
49. Id. at 713.
Chief Justice Hughes relied on Blackstone and other
commentators' disdain for prior restraints. Moreover, he likened the system of
restraint in Near to the English licensing schemes, and thus struck down the statute.
50. Id. at 716.
51. Id. (citations omitted). These exceptions, as well as others, are discussed infra
at Part I.B.2.
52. Near, 283 U.S. at 715. Hughes quotes Cooley noting "[tihe liberty of the press
might be rendered a mockery and a delusion.... if, while every man was at liberty to
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Though Near is regarded as a landmark decision in prior restraint
law, and has clearly shaped the future case law on the subject, it is an
unsatisfying opinion in many respects. 3 First, the Court provided no
insight into why prior restraints are so much more abhorrent to First
Amendment rights than other forms of regulation. 4 Second, the
Court made no effort to define prior restraints.
Regardless, the
Court did make it clear that injunctions were prior restraints, and that
prior restraints existed under the specter of unconstitutionality. 6
Thus, injunctions were presumptively unconstitutional. This clear
principal has been instrumental in the development of the law of prior
restraints.
3. Types of Restraints
Prior restraints come in a few varieties, which Emerson enumerated
in his article, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint. The first type of
restraint, previously discussed, is the administrative preclearance that
England employed as a means to restrict speech, and which the
United States Supreme Court has criticized over the years. 8
Administrative preclearance, in a sense, operates as a statute enforced
by criminal prosecution and punishment.59 The enforcement of the
law has nothing to do with the speech itself, but rather with whether
an individual had acquired permission before publication.6"
The second type of prior restraint arises out of the judicial issuance
of preliminary injunctions against speech.6 1 In injunction cases,62
publish what he pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for
harmless publications." Id; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
53. See Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 506 (1970);
Sandra Lynn Jordan, Bering v. Share: Abortion ProtestorsLose Ground in the State
of Washington, 18 Cumb. L. Rev. 205, 211 (1987).
54. See Emerson, supra note 53, at 506; Jordan, supra note 53, at 211.
55. See Emerson, supra note 53, at 506; Jordan, supra note 53, at 211.
56. Near, 283 U.S. at 716; see also Wells, supra note 30, at 9 (suggesting that the
Court deemed prior restraints to be presumptively unconstitutional, but failed to
address how they differed from other forms of restraint).
57. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 655; see also supra Part I.A.1.
58. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 421-26. Jeffries discusses both case law and
commentators who have denounced systems of administrative preclearance. See also
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1965) (striking down a statute requiring prior licensing of movies by the
Maryland State Board of Censors); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951)
(holding that systems of administrative preclearance are generally invalid); Tribe,
supra note 36, at §§ 12-35, 12-36, at 1042-54. See generally Howard 0. Hunter,
Toward a Better Understandingof the PriorRestraint Doctrine: A Reply to Professor
Mayton, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 283 (1982).
59. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 421-22.
60. See id. at 421; Shinn, supra note 31, at 383.
61. Emerson, supra note 1, at 655-56; Shinn, supra note 31, at 383-84.
62. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Walker v. City of
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unlike the administrative preclearance cases, speech is not punishable
in a subsequent fashion. Thus, if no prior restraint was issued, the
speech cannot be attacked.63
The third category of restraints is legislative prior restraint statutes.
These statutes, as their name indicates, make it unlawful to publish
anything that does not comply with a "legislative act. '64 In essence,
these are quite similar to administrative preclearance.6 5
Emerson's final category of prior restraints is termed indirect or
secondary prior restraints. 66 These occur when political views or other
beliefs serve as a prerequisite for entering a certain office. 67 An
example of an indirect restraint appears within the Taft-Hartley Act,68
which included a non-communist affidavit and contains loyalty
security programs. 69
This Note concentrates on administrative
preclearance and its similarity to prior restraint statutes, as compared
with injunctions that serve as prior restraints.
i. Administrative Preclearance
Administrative preclearance centers around the concept of
permission.7" A modern example of such administrative preclearance
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). It should
be noted that these are only three of many famous cases dealing with injunctions. See
also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1345 (1st Cir. 1986);
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
63. For the purposes of this Note, an "attack" on speech occurs when a party
attempts to have it enjoined prior to publication. In certain instances, such as in Near,
the speech may have been subject to a defamation action. See 283 U.S. at 697. In an
action for defamation, the complaining party can obtain damages in the form of
monetary compensation. However, the party cannot obtain redress in the form of an
injunction of speech. These are two separate proceedings. This is also the case in
other tort actions, such as actions regarding the right of publicity and disclosure of
private or embarrassing facts.
This list is by no means exhaustive, but is simply being used to exemplify that
other means are available for challenging speech, even if they do not lead to its
suppression. "Not all speech will satisfy the requisite elements of these torts and thus
generate legal liability for the speaker, but all speech will be 'screened' in the sense
that it has the potential to generate legal liability for the speaker should the requisite
elements be present." Scordato, supra note 6, at 17.
64. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 656.
65. See infra Part I.A.3.i.
66. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 656.
67. See id.
68. In 1947 Congress passed the Labor-Management Relations Act, more
commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act. In short, the act enlarged the National
Labor Relations Board, thus establishing greater control over labor disputes. See
Infoplease.com,
Taft-Hartley
Labor
Act,
at
http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/bus/A0847620.html (last visited. Sept. 17, 2003).
69. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 656.
70. See Vince Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1482,
1549-50 (1970).
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is the rating system employed by the motion picture industry. Under

this type of restraint, publications have to be pre-screened by what is
in effect a censor before they go to print. The courts and
commentators alike have been highly critical of such a system. 7,

The main complaint about a system of administrative preclearance
is the bureaucracy that it creates. "The function of the censor is to

censor. He has a professional interest in finding things to suppress. "72
Thus such a system lacks the objectivity, sensitivity, and the deference
that ought to be afforded when dealing with constitutional rights.

From this suggestion, courts and commentators have drawn the
conclusion that administrative preclearance restrictions suffer from
overbreadth.73
ii. PreliminaryInjunctions

An injunction is a court order designed to prevent a wrong from

occurring in the future. 74 When a court issues an injunction in a case

regarding speech, the person who wishes to speak is foreclosed from
doing so at the current time. Essentially, the speech is suppressed
before it occurs, rather than being punished subsequently, as would
normally be the case when a statute is violated. 7 The speech is
forbidden, and if one decides to disobey the court order and
exercise
76

his "right" to speak, he may face criminal contempt charges.

Injunctions clearly have a drastic effect on the rights of an

individual, and thus should be issued sparingly. Rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a basic framework for
when an injunction should be issued.77 However, in a practical sense,
the determination is situation-dependent, and at the discretion of the
71. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 659; Jeffries, supra note 4, at 422-24; see also
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1965); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Hunter, supra note 58, at
283; Tribe, supra note 36, at §§ 12-35, 12-36, at 1042-54.
72. Emerson, supra note 1, at 659.
73. See Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 153-59. The Court held the law to be
unconstitutional because of its overbreadth. The Court stated that the law failed to
provide "narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority."
Id. at 151; see also Jeffries, supra note 4, at 422-24.
74. Owen M. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction 8 (1978); see also McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24 (2002) (seeking an injunction to prevent the withdrawal of prison
privileges); Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999)
(seeking an injunction to prevent a scheduled execution).
75. Upon violating a statute the alleged perpetrator may challenge the validity of
such statute.
76. Carolyn Grose, Note, "Put Your Body on the Line:" Civil Disobedience and
Injunctions, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 1497, 1504-05 (1994) (providing a lucid and concise
overview of the effect of an injunction).
77. Among other things, Rule 65 requires a showing that the speech will cause
immediate and irreparable injury. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
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court.78 In determining when to issue an injunction, courts engage in
the practice of "balancing equities" or "balancing hardship."79 In the

context of injunctions on speech, this means balancing a constitutional
right against the possible harm that will occur if that right is exercised.
Because injunctions on speech have such a detrimental and direct
impact on a right afforded by the Constitution, there is a strong
presumption that such injunctions are unconstitutional and should not
be issued or upheld.8" However, it should be noted that there are

instances where an injunction would be merited.8"
iii. PriorRestraint Statutes

A prior restraint statute restricts the opportunity to publish unless
an individual or organization complies with the regulations set forth

by the statute.82 If publishers are delinquent in their duty to obey the
statute, they will be subject to punishment.

Emerson provides

examples of such types of prior restraints; including taxes on
newspapers, or the requirement that lobbyists and political
organizations be registered.83 Thus, if the tax is not paid or the
organization does not register, the violators will be subject to legal
sanctions for their failure to comply with the law."
This type of statute deals largely with notification and serves as a
prior restraint. Essentially, if a party notifies the government of the

existence of its organization, whether by paying a tax or by registering,

then the party possesses the right to disseminate speech.85 Another
type of statute, which is not a prior restraint, is one that limits the
content of what is being discussed. Some laws subject speech to the

possibility of civil actions. Defamatory speech, speech that invades
someone's privacy by portraying them in a false light, the public
disclosure of private or embarrassing facts, and appropriation can all

78. This conclusion is gleaned from the voluminous case law regarding
injunctions. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 201 (1973).
79. Id. at 201; In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1985); Roland
Machinery Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1984); Buffalo Forge Co.
v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 638 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1981).
80. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); see infra Part I.C.1 for
an extended discussion of this principle in the context of First Amendment rights and
the role of injunctions.
81. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at
714; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1345 (1st Cir. 1986). This
also will be discussed in greater detail at infra notes 118-22, 159-68, and 171-74 and
accompanying text. See also Parts I.C, II.A.
82. See Emerson, supra note 1, at 656; Jeffries, supra note 4, at 421.
83. Emerson, supra note 1, at 656.
84. Id.
85. See infra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
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lead to legal liability.8 6
Just as these laws prohibit certain actions, laws could be drafted
that prohibit the discussion of certain topics. In a sense, these laws
would be akin to administrative preclearance. The difference is
simply that under administrative preclearance one would have to gain
permission from a censor,87 whereas under a statutory system, the law
would already be in place to dictate what speech is allowed.88 Each
system has both positive and negative aspects.
Statutes offer
certainty, but it may be extremely difficult to draft one that is not
overbroad or underinclusive. Contrarily, administrative preclearance
may be tailored specifically to the speech in question;8 9 however, such
restrictions may be arbitrary and dependent on the particular censor
addressing the issue.
4. The Implications of a Statute Prohibiting Speech as Compared with
an Injunction
In the case of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, Chief Justice
Burger described the effect of prior restraints on speech versus
subsequent punishment's effect on speech. "A prior restraint, by
contrast and by definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction.
If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after
publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the
time."'9 Burger, however, failed to detail how or why an injunction
would have a greater effect on restricting speech than would a
subsequent punishment.91 Presumably, the logic is that an injunction
deems speech inappropriate prior to its use. On the other hand, a
subsequent punishment follows speech, and therefore the speech is
made public prior to any threat of punishment. The difference thus
lies in the timing of the punishment. Though an issue of timing in
many instances may seem relatively unimportant, in this particular
context it makes a substantial difference. A subsequent punishment
allows speech to be disseminated before it is attacked, while an
86. See Scordato, supra note 6, at 17; see, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51
(1965) (holding that a particular content-based prior restraint was unconstitutional);
see also R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under The Equal Protection Clause
and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The "Base Plus
Six" Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice,4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 225, 246 (2002).
87. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing two different types of
statutory restrictions on speech).
89. However, this may not be the case. As noted earlier, the role of the censor
may serve to perpetuate his own existence, and therefore lead to a problem of
overbreadth. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
90. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (citing Alexander M.
Bickel, The Morality of Consent 61 (1975)).
91. Id.; see Wells, supra note 30, at 18.
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injunction shuts off speech before there is any opportunity to

disseminate it.92 The ability to publish information is key, and the

timing of a restraint directly impacts this ability.
B. CollateralBar Rule
The collateral bar rule dictates that even unconstitutional court
orders must be obeyed, or the opportunity to challenge their validity
is forfeited.9 3 This further supports the argument that injunctions on
speech serve as a greater deterrent than subsequent punishments.94
The argument revolves around the application of the collateral bar

rule.
The collateral bar rule has a long history in the jurisprudence of the
United States. 9 "The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the validity of a judicial order is determined by the court of
first instance, and until its decision is modified or vacated through
subsequent judicial process, disobedience of the order is in contempt
of the court's lawful authority." 96 In the First Amendment context,
the collateral bar rule applies as follows: if a publication is enjoined
by a court, the would-be publisher of the material has to withhold
from publishing the article if he wishes to maintain his right to
challenge the validity of the speech and the invalidity of the order. If
he chooses to publish, he will be held in contempt regardless of
whether the injunction was erroneous and the speech was meritorious
under the relevant substantive law.97 Thus, a publisher is presented
with two options, both of which lead to an unappealing result.
However, if the publisher obeys the order and retains his right to
92. See Jeffries, supra note 4, at 430; Andrew P. Napolitano, Whatever Happened
To Freedom of Speech? A Defense of "State Interest of the Highest Order" As a
Unifying Standard ForErraticFirst Amendment Jurisprudence,29 Seton Hall L. Rev.
1197, 1254 (1999).
93. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); In re Providence
Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496
(5th Cir. 1972).
94. See generally supra Part I.A.4 and infra Part III.A.
95. See Redish, supra note 38, at 93. Redish points out that the collateral bar rule
has not been restricted to First Amendment jurisprudence, but rather has been used
in a variety of instances.
96. See Hasiotis, supra note 16, at 267; see also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union
759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S.
757, 766 (1983) (holding a court ordered injunction must be obeyed until amended or
vacated); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980) (same);
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 439 (1976) (same). An
injunction issued under a law that has the pretense of unconstitutionality must still be
obeyed until vacated or modified. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258, 293 (1947) (holding that erroneous orders must be abided by until amended or
vacated). See also discussion infra Part I.B.1.
97. See Walker, 388 U.S. at 320-21; Providence Journal, 820 F.2d at 1345;
Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 500.
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challenge the validity, the news may become stale and worthless to
him.98 If he chooses to publish, he will undoubtedly be subject to

criminal contempt.9 9 The argument thus follows that the collateral bar
rule has a greater deterrent effect on speech than a statute providing

for subsequent punishment. Once an injunction is violated, a
publisher is liable regardless of whether the injunction was issued
erroneously. Conversely, one who is alleged to have violated
a statute
10 0
maintains his right to challenge that statute's validity.
The rule's purpose has been best summed up by Justice Stewart's
statement in Walker v. Birmingham: "[N]o man can be judge in his

own case, however exalted his station, however righteous his
motives .. ."101 Moreover, by requiring deference to a court-issued

injunction, the collateral bar rule creates a respect for the judiciary.0 2
It should be noted that while the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit
have explicitly endorsed the collateral bar rule,0 3 some states have
adopted slightly different approaches to the application of the rule."°

However, for the purposes of this Note, the focus will be on the
interpretation of the collateral bar rule within the federal system.
1. Walker v. Birmingham
The Supreme Court touched on the collateral bar rule in Walker v.
Birmingham, a First Amendment case.0 5 In Walker, Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. led a group of local ministers in planning a protest

98. See Richard E. Labunski, The 'CollateralBar' Rule and the First Amendment:
The Constitutionality of Enforcing Unconstitutional Orders, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 323,
331-32 (1988).
99. See Walker, 388 U.S. at 320-21; see also Labunski, supra note 98, at 332.
100. The collateral bar rule does not exist in a vacuum. There are several
exceptions. One in particular, the "transparently invalid" exception, has taken the
teeth out of what seems like an otherwise harsh rule. See infra notes 117-20 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these exceptions.
101. Walker, 388 U.S. at 320-21.
102. Lawrence N. Gray, Criminal and Civil Contempt: Some Sense of a
Hodgepodge, 13 J. Suffolk Acad. L. 1, 21 (1999).
103. Id.; see United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972). In Dickinson,
the Fifth Circuit held that contempt charges levied against newspaper reporters were
valid despite the invalidity of the court orders. The court noted that the collateral bar
rule is a "well-established principle" and "an injunction duly issuing out of a court
having subject matter and personal jurisdiction must be obeyed, irrespective of the
ultimate validity of the order." Id. at 509. Dickinson had a tremendous impact on
First Amendment case law. The decision came at a time when courts were moving
toward exempting First Amendment cases from the collateral bar rule. See Labunski,
supra note 98, at 337-38. Dickinson served to reaffirm the existence of the collateral
bar rule within First Amendment doctrine.
104. See Labunski, supra note 98, at 348-63. Labunski undertakes a case study of
the collateral bar rule in several different state jurisdictions.
105. Walker, 388 U.S. at 320-21.
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against racial segregation. 0 6 In an effort to comply with local law, the
protesters made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a permit. 107 In
accord with the ordinance that required the permit, local authorities
were able to obtain a temporary restraining order against the
protestors. 108 King and his followers decided to disobey the court
order and were subsequently arrested and held in contempt of court.
109

The Supreme Court upheld the Alabama court's decision finding
the protestors in contempt. 1 0 The lower court focused on the fact that
the protestors made no effort to comply with the judge's order, and
only challenged the injunction after the parades took place.'
It is
worth noting that even though the Court agreed with this reasoning,
the Court implicitly
acknowledged that the ordinance was
12
unconstitutional.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional statute is an absolute nullity
and may not form the basis of any legal right or legal proceedings,
yet until its unconstitutionality has been judicially declared in
appropriate proceedings, no person charged with its observance
under an order or decree may disregard or violate the order or the
decree with immunity from a charge of contempt of court; and he
may not raise the question of its unconstitutionality in collateral
proceedings on appeal from
a judgment of conviction for contempt
3
of the order or decree."

According to the Court, precedent clearly put the petitioners on
notice that they could not bypass orderly judicial review of the
injunction before disobeying it.114
106. Id. at 310.
107. See id. at 310-12.
108. For the purposes of this Note, a temporary restraining order ("TRO") has the
same effect on speech as an injunction. The main difference is that a TRO is valid for
a shorter period of time than an injunction.
109. This is the exact type of situation that is alluded to at infra notes 240-41 and
accompanying text. If Dr. King and his followers had never applied for the permit,
they would not have been subject to an injunction and subsequent contempt charge.
If they had chosen this course of action, they would have been able to challenge the
validity of the ordinance at a later date. In fact, in Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, the very same statute was violated. 394 U.S. 147 (1969). However, in
Shuttlesworth, no injunction was issued prior to the violation. The petitioners faced
no contempt charge and even had their convictions for violating the ordinance
overturned on appeal. The Court reasoned, "our decisions have made clear that a
person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage
with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports
to require a license." Id. at 151.
110. Walker, 388 U.S. at 315.
111. Id. at 311, 318 (referencing the lower court's opinion).
112. Id. at 320.
113. Id. (citing Fields v. City of Fairfield, 143 So. 2d. 177, 180 (Ala. 1962)).
114. Id.
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Despite the presumption of unconstitutionality, the Court still
upheld the contempt charge in accordance with established precedent.
The Court thereby established the presumption that even
unconstitutional orders must be obeyed until they are vacated or
amended.115
2. Exceptions to the Collateral Bar Rule
Exceptions to the collateral bar rule have developed, in part, as a
check against abuses of judicial power. These exceptions are geared
toward instances where prior restraints are issued by a judge who
either does not have the authority to do so, or where the judgment of
the issuing judge is drastically skewed. While the exceptions are
sensible as a mechanism to check judicial power, their development
has ultimately weakened the force of the collateral bar rule.
The first intimation of an exception came in the Court's prior
restraint case Walker v. City of Birmingham. In Walker, Justice
Stewart announced: "Without question the state court that issued the
injunction had.., jurisdiction over the petitioners and over the
subject matter of the controversy. And this is not a case where the
injunction was transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense
'
to validity."116
Accordingly, three exceptions can be gleaned from this
statement, including those instances:
1) where the court lacks
personal jurisdiction; 2) where the court lacks subject matter
'
jurisdiction; and 3) where the injunction is "transparently invalid."117
Thus, "[a] party subject to an order that constitutes a transparently
invalid prior restraint on pure speech may challenge the order by
violating it."" 8 Therefore, the rather harsh collateral bar rule has
been significantly defanged. Now, in "limited" circumstances, a
person can violate the order without forfeiting his right to challenge
the validity." 9 The guiding principle behind all of these exceptions to
the rule is that while deference should be shown to the judiciary, it
must be subject to some constraints. Therefore, the exceptions serve
as a means to protect against "improper exercise of judicial
'
authority."120
The obvious question at this point is what constitutes a
transparently invalid order. The First Circuit in In re Providence
Journal Co. failed to provide any significant guidance. 21 Admittedly,
115.
116.
117.
invalid
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. at 315.
For the purposes of this Note, the discussion will focus on the transparently
exception.
In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1344 (1st Cir. 1986).
Id.
See Hasiotis, supra note 16, at 272.
Providence Journalestablished that that transparently invalid orders could be
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the court recognized that the "line between a transparently invalid
order and one that is merely invalid is, of course, not always
distinct. '12 Thus, the court has left us with the following: "'[A] very
clearly wrong' court order is not void and must be obeyed," however,
"orders which are transparently invalid.., need not be obeyed. ' 123
This standard seems impossible to apply. Without a clear explanation
from the courts as to what constitutes an invalid order as opposed to a
transparently invalid order, it is unreasonable to expect publishers to
make such a determination. When an order attacks protected pure
speech,1 4 it amounts to a distinction without a difference. Though the
language in Providence Journal intimates that situations may exist
where an order restricting pure speech is valid,125 through tracing the
case law it becomes apparent that any 26 restriction on protected pure
speech would be inherently transparently invalid. 27

violated. The court, however, failed to provide insight or examples regarding what
may constitute a transparently invalid order.
122. ProvidenceJournal,820 F.2d at 1347.
123. See Gray, supra note 102, at 21 (citations omitted).
124. The term "pure speech" refers to printed material and oral speech. Other
categories of speech, such as demonstrations, do not fall into this category. For
example, the speech at issue in Walker cannot be said to be pure speech; however, the
speech at issue in Near v. Minnesota is considered pure speech. A distinction is made
within the realm of pure speech, i.e. between speech that is protected by the First
Amendment, and speech that is unprotected. There has been a great deal of debate
as to whether certain categories of speech should be considered "unprotected" as
opposed to "less protected." However, for the purposes of this Note, it is only
important to understand that certain categories of speech have traditionally not
received protection from the courts. "[F]reedom of speech is not absolute, the court
added: some types of speech are unprotected or entitled to narrow protection
(obscenity, child pornography, fighting words, incitement to imminent lawless activity,
and purposely or recklessly made false statements of fact)." Alan Stephens,
Annotation, First Amendment Guaranty of Freedom of Speech or Press as Defense to
Liability Stemming from Speech Allegedly Causing Bodily Injury, 94 A.L.R. Fed. 26,
40 (1989). Conversely, some categories of speech retain ultimate protection by the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, recognized that
political speech is at the core of the First Amendment. See 395 U.S. 444, 447-49
(1969); see Stephens, supra at 40. The type of speech that this Note proposes as
dangerous, and that may be in need of restriction, is likely protected and political in
nature. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
125. See ProvidenceJournal,820 F.2d at 1344.
126. There are a few exceptions where a restriction on speech may not be
transparently invalid. See infra Part I.B.2.
127. See infra Part III.A.
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i. PriorRestraints on Unprotected Pure Speech
Are Not Inherently
2
TransparentlyInvalid 1
In addition to the protection of national security, 129 the Court in
Near v. Minnesota held that certain categories of speech might be
enjoined prior to their dissemination. The court stated:
On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be
enforced against obscene publications. The security of the
community life may be protected against incitements to acts of
violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government. The
constitutional guaranty of free speech does not "protect a man from
an injunction
against uttering words that may have all the effect of
130
force."

Chief Justice Hughes specifically discussed obscenity and speech that
may incite violent actions.13 ' Since the Court's decision in Near, the
number of categories of "pure speech" that can be restricted without a
presumption that the restraint is transparently invalid has grown. The
additions fall almost exclusively in the realm of intellectual property
and privacy law, and include copyright violations, theft of the right of
publicity, and dissemination of intimate or embarrassing facts. 132
a. Obscenity

133

The First Amendment does not protect obscenity.13 1 Chief Justice
Hughes included this unprotected form of speech as one that could be
legitimately enjoined with a prior restraint.'
That being said, the
case law has developed in such a manner that even unprotected
128. This section is designed to make clear that there are certain categories of pure
speech for which prior restraints are not inherently transparently invalid. Thus, the
analysis of the issue does not pertain to these categories of speech.
129. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
130. Id. at 716 (citations omitted).
131. Id.
132. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147 (1998).
133. Obscenity has been chosen as an example representing all forms of
unprotected speech for which prior restraints remain presumptively constitutional.
Other forms include libel and defamation.
134. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller test has been adopted to
determine when material is considered obscene. The test includes three parts, all of
which need to be satisfied.
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
135. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
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speech, such as obscenity, has not been subject to preliminary

injunctive relief.'36 In Vance v. Universal Amusement Company, the

Court reasoned that such injunctions were unconstitutional because
the prior restraints were of indefinite duration and had not been
finally adjudicated to be obscene.'3 7 In determining whether prior

restraints are constitutional for other forms of unprotected speech,
such as libel, the courts have used similar reasoning.'3 8 Because there
is no final adjudication regarding the nature of the speech at the time

of the preliminary hearing, there is still a presumption that a prior
restraint is unconstitutional.
Although a transparently invalid prior restraint on unprotected
speech can be violated much the same as a prior restraint on protected
speech, prior restraints on pure speech, unprotected by the First
Amendment, are not inherently transparently invalid. However,
because prior restraints are generally issued prior to a full and fair

hearing, it is difficult to determine whether the speech in question is in
actuality

unprotected.139

Therefore,

prior

restraints

remain

presumptively unconstitutional, even where the speech may be
unprotected.
b. Copyright Infringement1 4

The First Amendment does not protect speech that infringes upon a

copyright. 4 1 In the case of Harper & Row, Publishers,Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises the Supreme Court held that a copyright is an "engine of
free expression" that "supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas.' ' 42 Accordingly, "[c]opyright law restricts speech:

it restricts you from writing, painting, publicly performing, or
136. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980); see also Blount v.
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
137. Vance, 445 U.S. at 312.
138. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 132, at 173-74 (noting that allegedly libelous
speech is often not subject to preliminary injunctions because no final adjudication
regarding its libelous nature can be reached at the preliminary injunction stage).
139. Id.
140. Copyright infringement has been chosen as a representative example of many
different infringements of intellectual property rights. The law regarding the issuance
of prior restraints in trademark infringement cases aligns most closely with that of
copyright. See id. at 217. However, there are some differences between the two. The
burden placed on plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction in a trademark
infringement case is higher than that in a copyright action. Id. In trade secret cases,
preliminary injunctions are subject to the traditional four-part test. See infra note 146
and accompanying text. However, the elements are given sharper "teeth" in
trademark cases than they are granted in copyright cases. See Lemley & Volokh,
supra note 132, at 229. Finally, in the context of the right of publicity there is no clear
precedent as to whether prior restraints are presumptively valid or invalid. Id. at 22829.
141. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
142. Id. at 558.
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Though libel,
otherwise communicating what you please. ' 143
obscenity, and speech infringing upon a copyright are all unprotected,
speech infringing upon a copyright has received drastically different
treatment by the courts. Unlike obscenity, where prior restraints
remain presumptively invalid and are extremely hard to obtain,'"
enjoining speech that threatens a copyright has become
commonplace.145
The issuance of a preliminary injunction in a copyright case is
subject to a four-pronged test.146 Yet, "[i]n a copyright infringement
action,. . . the rules are somewhat different. ' 147 In copyright cases,
application of the factors that determine whether an injunction will be
issued is often skewed in favor of plaintiffs seeking to protect their
copyrights. 4 8
The difference between the ability to obtain preliminary injunction
in obscenity and copyright infringement cases does not affect the
application of the transparently invalid exception to unprotected
categories of speech. 49 For both unprotected and protected pure
speech a transparently invalid prior restraint can be violated without
suffering the consequences of the collateral bar rule. 50 However, a
prior restraint suppressing unprotected pure speech, whether
presumptively invalid, as is the case with obscenity, or generally valid,
as is the case with copyright infringement, is not inherently

143. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 132, at 165-66.
144. See supra Part I.B.2.i.a.
145. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 132, at 150.
146. The test asks: (1) whether success on the merits is likely; (2) whether
irreparable injury will occur if the injunction is not granted; (3) "whether the balance
of hardships tips in the plaintiff's favor"; and (4) whether public interest is served by
granting the injunction. Id. at 158; see 11A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2948 (2d ed. 1995) (detailing the test and its application in
case law).
147. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir.
1995).
148. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 132, at 158-59; see also Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1523 (D. Colo. 1995) (describing the test for
preliminary injunctive relief in copyright cases as "less rigorous" than the normal
standard). The inquiry is certainly more detailed than what has been presented here.
Its purpose for this Note is simply providing the background as a means to
differentiate between the treatment certain categories of "pure speech" receive. For
a comprehensive discussion of this topic see, Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh
Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147
(1998).
149. Obscenity and copyright infringement are highlighted because they represent
opposite ends of the spectrum. Prior restraints on alleged obscene speech remain
presumptively invalid, whereas prior restraints on speech that allegedly violates a
copyright are commonplace. All the other types of unprotected speech fall within this
spectrum.
150. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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transparently invalid."'
C. Modern PriorRestraint Doctrine
The case of New York Times Co. v. United States affirmed that prior
restraints are presumptively unconstitutional. Even national security
concerns do not change this belief. Indeed, prior restraints are
presumptively unconstitutional unless a type of speech falls directly
within the exceptions outlined by the Court in Near v. Minnesota, for
example if the publication imperils the transport of troops. The
Supreme Court would have been faced with a significant challenge to
this presumption had it heard the case of United States v. Progressive,
1 52
Inc.

1. New York Times Co. v. United States and its Progeny
On June 13, 1971, the New York Times printed the first article of
what would become known as the "Pentagon Papers.1 ' 53 The articles
were based on a study that had been leaked to the Times,'54 and
detailed United States policy and decision-making throughout the
Vietnam War.1 55 Two days later, one of the sharpest and quickest
legal battles in American history commenced.
However, the
government successfully obtained a temporary restraining order
enjoining the Times from continuing to publish the Pentagon
Papers. 156 Though the government won the first battle, it suffered a
57
set-back when the Washington Post began running similar articles.
After a trial court loss and a Saturday morning appeal,15 1 the Post also
was temporarily enjoined and the case was remanded for further
review. The parties jockeyed their way through the federal court
system with great haste. On Saturday, June 26, 1971, just thirteen
days after the initial publication, the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments. Four days later, in the case of New York Times Co. v.
United States, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in favor of
the Times and the Post, and laid the foundation for future prior
151. See supra Part I.B.2.i. The distinction lies in speech that is protected versus
speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment.
152. See L.A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb Injunction, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 55 (1990); see
supra Part I.C.2..
153. David Rudenstine, The Day the Presses Stopped: A History of the Pentagon
Papers Case 1 (1996).
154. It has been suggested that the N.Y. Times illegally obtained the information
used in this publication. See In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1348-49 (1st
Cir. 1986).
155. See Rudenstine, supra note 153, at 1-2.
156. United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
157. See Rudenstine, supra note 153, at 2-3.
158. Id.
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restraint law. 159
The government argued its brief on two grounds. "'The authority
of the Executive Department to protect the nation against publication
of information whose disclosure would endanger the national security
stems from two interrelated sources: the constitutional power of the
President over the Conduct of foreign affairs and his authority as
Commander-in-Chief." ' 1 The interrelation between the two boiled
down to the idea that the publication should be enjoined in the
interest of national security.161 Near v. Minnesota provided the
motivation for an argument that a prior restraint could be upheld in
the interest of national security. 162 There the Court reasoned that,
"[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of163 the sailing
dates of transports or the number and location of troops.
In his concurrence in New York Times, Justice Brennan took note
of this argument. Brennan responded, "there is a single, extremely
narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment's ban on prior
judicial restraint may be overridden."'" Brennan, however, indicated
165
that this has been reserved only for when the nation is at war.
"Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication must
inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event
kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can
support even the issuance of an interim restraining order. ' 166 Justice
Stewart, also concurring, argued that an injunction would only be
warranted when disclosure of the documents involved would "surely
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or
its people.' 67
While the Court undoubtedly considered the government's
argument regarding national security, it was ultimately denied."6 The
government was misguided in attempting to equate the effect of the
Pentagon Papers with the exceptions stated in Near.169 The Pentagon
Papers reported history that would presumably embarrass the United
159. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
160. Id. at 718 (citations omitted).
161. Id.
162. 283 U.S. 697,716 (1931).
163. Id.
164. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 726-27.
167. Id. at 730 (Stewart J., concurring).
Brennan quoted from Stewart's
concurrence in his own concurrence in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 593 (1976).
168. See N.Y Times, 403 U.S. at 713.
169. Near v. Minnesota has come to stand for the proposition that in a very limited
number of cases where national security is an issue, a prior restraint may be valid. See
283 U.S. 697,716 (1931).
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States, thus holding up negotiations to end the United States'
involvement and effectuate the removal of troops. Near's exceptions
regarded immediate and direct impacts on the nation, but the
reasoning as to why the publication of the Pentagon Papers would
compromise national security was indirect. Thus, in New York Times,
the Supreme Court held that an injunction on the press would
constitute an impermissible prior restraint. 7 0 The Court went on to
note, "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity."' 7 1
This strong presumption of unconstitutionality bears even more
weight when the speech at issue is considered pure. In the case of In
re Providence Journal Co., the First Circuit asserted that the
presumption of unconstitutionality is virtually insurmountable when
dealing with a prior restraint on pure speech.172 In its history, the
Supreme Court has yet to uphold a prior restraint on protected pure
speech. The national security interest set forth by the government in
the Pentagon Papers was insufficient to enjoin the publication of
articles, despite the fact that the content was likely derived though
criminal conduct, and implicated a national security interest on some
level. 17 3 Moreover, in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, the Court
chose to strike down a prior restraint on pure speech, rather than to
ensure a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.174 As the
Court stated in CBS v. Davis:
Although the prohibition against prior restraints is by no means
absolute, the gagging of publication has been considered acceptable
only in "exceptional cases." Even where questions of allegedly
urgent national security, or competing constitutional interests, are
concerned, we have imposed this "most extraordinary remed[y]"
only where the evil that would result from the reportage is both
great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive
measures. 175
Seemingly, the Court finds much greater equity in protecting speech
than in protecting either national security or other constitutional
interests.
170. N.Y Times, 403 U.S. at 714; see CBS v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315 (1994).
171. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (citation omitted). It should be noted that in
Near, the Supreme Court stated that the publication of troop movements could be
restricted. 283 U.S. at 716.
172. In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1348 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Neb.
Press, 427 U.S. at 558, 570 (White, J. concurring)); see also Part I.B.2.i (describing
instances where prior restraint is not necessarily transparently invalid).
173. See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text; see also ProvidenceJournal,820
F.2d at 1349.
174. Neb. Press, 427 U.S. at 570; see ProvidenceJournal,820 F.2d at 1349.
175. CBS, 510 U.S. at 1317 (citations omitted).
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2. United States v. Progressive,Inc.
In light of the decisions that have been handed down over the years
and the rhetoric of the Court, it seems very unlikely that a case could
ever spur the Court to uphold a prior restraint on protected pure
speech.1 76 A significant, though likely futile, challenge to this principle
might have arisen had the Supreme Court heard the case of United
States v. Progressive, Inc. 177 In Progressive, the District Court of
Wisconsin enjoined the publication of an article entitled "The HBomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We're Telling It."' 78 The district
court reasoned that the article threatened "direct, immediate and
irreparable injury to our nation and its people.' 1 79 Moreover, the court
argued that the publication of the article would violate the Atomic
Energy Act.18 °
A combination of the aforementioned factors led the court to hold
that the "disparity of the risk" between offending First Amendment
rights and the national security risk was too great to allow the
publication of the article. 8 ' The district court essentially argued that
this case was akin to the exception in Near v. Minnesota."8 The court
reasoned that the level of danger posed by the publication of an
article detailing how to create a hydrogen bomb was equivalent to the
danger associated with the publication of troop movements because of
new technologies that make long-range quick strikes possible. 83
This dispute was bound for the Supreme Court until the article's
impact was derailed by the publication of a letter containing
substantially the same material. 184 However, commentators speculate
that even an article describing the mechanism for creating a hydrogen
bomb
would
not
have overcome
the
presumption
of
unconstitutionality that accompanies prior restraints.'85 The injury
resulting from a hydrogen bomb ending up in the wrong hands would
certainly be irreparable and direct, however it is hard to imagine that
the impact of the article would have been immediate. 86 Thus, it was
176. See infra Part II.
177. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
178. Id. at 991.
179. Id. at 1000 (citation omitted); see supra note 167 and accompanying text
(quoting Justice Stewart's language).
180. See Progressive,467 F. Supp. at 996.
181. Id.
182. 283 U.S. 697 (1931); see supra Part I.A.2.
183. Progressive,467 F. Supp. at 996.
184. See Powe, supra note 152, at 55. A subsequent letter was published describing
how to construct a hydrogen bomb.
185. See id. at 60; Mary M. Cheh, The Progressive Case and the Atomic Energy Act:
Waking to the Dangers of Government Information Controls, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
163, 199 (1980).
186. See Powe, supra note 152, at 70.
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unlikely, and even improbable, that the Supreme Court would have
upheld such a prior restraint, especially in light of the past case law
and the general sentiment toward restricting speech.
In light of the preceding case law, Part II will address the argument
that current doctrine is inherently flawed, and does not adequately
address current national security concerns.
II. THE INHERENT FLAWS OF THE COLLATERAL BAR RULE

The collateral bar rule serves to protect the integrity of the
judiciary.'87 The collateral bar rule also seeks to protect against
persons acting as the "judge in [their] own case."' 88 Moreover, the
collateral bar rule supplies a unique and particularly important
function as applied to the First Amendment. The nature of the
activity (publication of sensitive material) to be stopped makes it
incredibly important that court orders be obeyed. Unlike violating a
subpoena order by a court, the violation of an order restraining
publication is irreversible.8 9
Whether the prior restraint was
constitutionally valid becomes moot at the very moment of
publication. Once the "cat is out of the bag," whether the injunction
had merit or not becomes a mere footnote. Presumably the damage
that the injunction sought to protect against has already occurred.
Thus, beyond protecting the dignity of the courts, we must be careful
to protect against the potential effect a publication can have on a
national security interest.
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has faced issues of
homeland security that have never before been addressed. Due to the
United States' current national security concerns, restrictions on the
publication of investigations of terrorist cells, plans to attack nations
with whom we are not at war, the sensitive material of international
negotiations, etc., may be warranted. 90 However, any restrictions in
the name of national security' 91 must be delicately balanced against
187. See Gray, supra note 102, at 21.
188. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967); see supra note 11012 and accompanying text.
189. A court ordered subpoena may be ignored without any real consequence to
the matter at hand. The government will simply find the individual and force
compliance. However, once injunctions on speech are broken, there is no redress
because the harm that the injunction was intended to prevent has already and
irreversibly been perpetrated.
190. These are just a few examples of types of publications that may pose a
national security risk and could be subject to restriction. See infra Part II.A for a
detailed discussion of two scenarios that may warrant restriction.
191. Speech that details issues of national security is likely political, and therefore
protected. See Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
Thus, any
injunction restricting it would be inherently transparently invalid. Compare Part
I.B.2.i.a with Part I.B.2.i.b.
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the impact which curtailing the free press will have on constitutional
rights.
The Supreme Court has never upheld a prior restraint on protected
pure speech. 192 Nor does it seem that the Court would uphold such a
restraint, unless the speech falls directly in line with the exceptions
detailed in Near v. Minnesota, 93 such as a publication announcing
troop movements. 194 The Court has not faced this situation since
Near, but it has been asked to render a decision on restricting speech
regarding other facts implicating national security and competing
constitutional rights. 95 Yet, in every instance, the Supreme Court has
declined to rule that a prior restraint on protected pure speech was
valid.' 96 There is no doubt that prior restraints have the specter of
unconstitutionality looming over them. 197
Restrictions on speech should be carefully scrutinized, but in certain
situations, they are a necessary evil in the quest to protect the
public.1 98 Even with the strong presumption against prior restraints
that has developed in the courts, the case law and even commentary
on the subject have developed along these lines. 199 It is clear that the
192. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
193. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); see also supra Part I.C.2. for a discussion of the
Supreme Court's likely holding in Progressive.
194. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. It should be noted that this exception was derived from
the Court's holding in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at
war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to
its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and
that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
249 U.S. at 52.
195. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); N.Y. Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
196. See supra notes 157-75 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.C.2
discussing Progressive. Though the Supreme Court never had the opportunity to
decide the case, commentators believe that the Court would have concluded that
publication of instructions for building a hydrogen bomb did not warrant a prior
restraint. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
197. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714 ("'Any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."'
(quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963))).
198. See infra Part II.A. As a means of protecting national security interests and
avoiding the presumptively invalid exception to the collateral bar rule accompanying
all protected pure speech, the courts could move speech dealing with national security
interest into the realm of unprotected speech. See infra Part III.B.3.
199. See N.Y Times, 403 U.S. at 714; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147, 153-59 (1969); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967);
Near, 283 U.S. at 716; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,
462 (1907); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1345 (1st Cir. 1986); United
States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992-94 (W.D. Wis. 1979); see also
Blackstone, supra note 34, at *152; Jeffries, supra note 4, at 412; Wells, supra note 30,
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courts, and indeed, the very same commentators who reject the
principle of prior restraints, believe that there are situations where
restrictions on protected pure speech are appropriate and necessary. 00
Despite this belief, the Supreme Court's past decisions have
essentially foreclosed the possibility of a case upholding a prior
restraint ever arriving at its doorstep.20 1 Nevertheless, such situations
possibly exist. Part II.A details two scenarios that would arguably
require the government to suppress speech. The first is drawn from a
Supreme Court case and the second is drawn from recent events.
A. Scenarios That May Warranta Restriction on Speech
Though the development of the case law has virtually eliminated
the possibility of suppressing such speech through a prior restraint, the
government can enact a statutory framework as a mechanism to
curtail dangerous speech.2 ° One situation that would surely warrant
restriction-possibly even via prior restraint-is the publication of
troop movements. 23 Depicting a single hypothetical, however, that
would warrant suppression is of little use, as a wide array of situations
exist where speech could endanger national security. Moreover, it
should be noted that at the time that Chief Justice Hughes declared
that the publication of troop movements was a significant threat to
national security and would warrant restriction,2 ° the press was
relatively unsophisticated. Today, no information is outside the reach
of the press, and therefore a host of issues endangering national
security could appear in print.

at 7.
200. See N.Y Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (recognizing that situations exist that would
render a prior restraint valid); Walker, 388 U.S. at 320-21 (same); Near, 283 U.S. at
716; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; Blackstone, supra note 34, at *152 (renouncing the idea
of a prior restraint, yet leaving open the possibility of subsequent punishment as a
means for restricting speech); Emerson, supra note 1, at 648 ("[R]estrictions which
could be validly imposed when enforced by subsequent punishment are, nevertheless,
forbidden if attempted by prior restraint.").
201. See infra Part III. Part III will detail how the Court's past decisions have
prohibited the collateral bar rule and the doctrine of prior restraints from operating as
originally intended. Thus, publishers will publish enjoined material and argue that
the injunction was transparently invalid, leaving no judicial recourse to restrict
speech.
202. See infra Part III.
203. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
204. Id.
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1. Scenario One: Newspaper Y Publishes the Names of Covert
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Agents and Details Special
Operations That They Will Undertake.
The first situation parallels Snepp v. United States2°5 and Haig v.
Agee.2 °6 In Snepp, CIA agent Frank Snepp sought to publish a book
detailing his experiences with CIA activities in South Vietnam.2 7 In
response, the government took pains to gain an injunction and set an
example by showing that the publication of CIA secrets would not
become a profitable business for CIA agents.20 8 The government
wisely steered clear of triggering the First Amendment, and was able
to obtain the relief they sought via a breach of contract claim.20 9
Snepp signed an agreement in which he agreed "not... [to]
publish.., any information or material relating to the Agency, its
activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after the
term of [his] employment.., without specific prior approval by the
Agency. ' ' 210 Though the Court relied on contract law to enjoin the
publication, it hinted that Snepp's book would have been enjoined
even if he had not signed the agreement.1
In Agee, CIA agent Philip Agee sought to discredit the CIA
following his retirement. Agee traveled abroad and "repeatedly and
publicly identified individuals and organizations located in foreign
countries as undercover CIA agents, employees, or sources. ' '212 As a
result of his actions, the Secretary of State revoked Agee's passport.213
Agee challenged the revocation, arguing that it violated his First
Amendment rights and his right to travel.2" 4 While Agee was
successful in the trial and appellate courts, 15 the Supreme Court
205. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
206. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
207. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507.
208. Judith Schenck Koffler & Bennett L. Gersham, The New Seditious Libel, 69
Cornell L. Rev. 816, 845-46 (1984) (noting that the Court's enforcement of the
injunction resulted in a $140,000 fine for Snepp).
209. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 515-16.
210. Id. at 508.
211. Id. at 511 n.6.
212. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 281, 284 (1981).
213. Id. at 286. The Secretary of State acted under the authority granted to him
under the Passport Act of 1926. The Act authorizes the Secretary of State to "grant
and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign
countries by diplomatic representatives of the United States... under such rules as
the President shall designate and prescribe" Id. at 290. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 211(a)
(1976 ed., Supp. IV)). The Court held that while the Act did not explicitly grant the
power to revoke passports, it does not expressly limit these powers either.
Accordingly, since the Secretary of State had the power to withhold passports for
reasons not explicitly stated in the Act, he could revoke passports in the same
manner. Id.
214. See id. at 306.
215. Agee v. Vance, 483 F. Supp. 729 (D.D.C. 1980), affd sub nom. Agee v.
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overturned these decisions. 216 The Court argued that Agee's actions
solicited murder and severely compromised the security of the United
States and other nations. 217 Although the Court paid relatively little
attention to the First Amendment claims, it did however, liken Agee's
actions to the publication of troop movements.218 Moreover, the
Court noted that Agee's statements "are clearly not protected by the
Constitution" because their intent was to "obstruct[] 21intelligence
9
operations and the recruitment of intelligence personnel.
In Snepp, the Government and the Court did everything within
their power to make sure the publication of CIA secrets was
prevented. Because Snepp had signed the confidentiality statement
upon the commencement of his employment with the CIA, the Court
and the Government had an alternative argument at their disposal:
that Snepp had violated the contract by threatening the publication of
information he learned during his employment without agency
approval. Likewise, in Agee the Court relied on alternate grounds to
withhold Agee's passport, though they did provide both an
explanation for the invocation of a prior restraint 22° and possible
grounds for a statute prohibiting this behavior. 221 Regardless of the
specific legal doctrine upon which the Supreme Court relied, the
rationale and result sought remain clear. In each of these cases, the
Government and the Court wanted to suppress speech because they
felt it endangered national security.
Scenario One and the Snepp case have differences, aside from the
confidentiality agreement. Mainly, the publication in Snepp was
subsequent to the events that it detailed, while Scenario One
presumes Newspaper Y has obtained the names of agents and the
details of their operations prior to or during their missions. Thus, the
information presented in Scenario One is even more sensitive than in
Snepp.
The information in the scenario is closer to Agee's
pronouncements, which the Court ruled were unprotected by the First
Amendment. 222 In light of the Government's arguments in Agee, it is
clear that the Government would deem the publication detailed in
Scenario One as detrimental to national security, and therefore would
argue it was an instance warranting suppression.

Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
216. Agee, 453 U.S. at 310.
217. Id. at 286, 308.
218. Id. at 308.
219. Id. at 309.
220. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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2. Scenario Two: Journal X Publishes Research on How to
Weaponize Anthrax

The second scenario is derived from a recent resolution of over
twenty scientific journals to withhold publication of articles that would
compromise national security. 23
The resolution stems from a

common mindset among scientists and editors. They "'don't want to
be the one that publishes 'Here's how to weaponize anthrax' and find
someone tomorrow used that and killed hundreds of thousands of
people.' ' 224 This mindset seeks to reduce the level of information

publicly available regarding biological or chemical compounds that
could be weaponized by terrorists. "[B]ioterrorism [is] a serious
threat '225 and this self-governing policy provides some protection.
Although many journals have adopted the policy, there still remains a

great deal of dissention as to the merits of such a pact within the
scientific community.2 26

Thus, the government has a legitimate

interest in
creating uniform regulation in this area to protect national
227
security.
Dissemination of information regarding nuclear physics is classified
and controlled via statute; 22s however, biological research is currently
unclassified. 229 As a result, the very real threat of a biological terrorist
attack may be fueled by the research published in scientific journals,
thus arguably warranting suppression.
It should be noted that the two scenarios presented above are by no
means exhaustive. In fact, hundreds of scenarios could arise that
would pose a comparable risk to national security, justifying prior
restraints on speech. The scenarios presented were chosen mainly
because they are rooted in concrete, factual instances that have
already occurred.

223. See Amy Harmon, Journal Editors to Consider U.S. Security in Publishing,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 2003, §1, at 1.
224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Some believe that "knowledge" rather than "ignorance" is the best defense.
There also remains questions as to how the policy detailed by the resolution would be
implemented.
227. Id. The American Society of Microbiology reported that among their eleven
journals, only two of 14,000 articles have been flagged since December 2001. Id. Thus,
governmental regulation is likely necessary to ensure that national security is
guarded.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (2000).
229. See Harmon, supra note 223.
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III. FILLING THE VOID: PRESERVING THE OPPORTUNITY TO
RESTRICT PURE SPEECH

On the surface, the problem appears to be that upon adjudication

all prior restraints will be overturned and publication will ensue.23 °
The greater issue, however, stems from the development of this

situation in the case law. The development of the First Amendment
law surrounding the collateral bar rule has rendered the rule and the
doctrine of prior restraints antiquated. 3 1 Thus, the original purpose
of the collateral bar rule conflicts with its current exception. The idea
of deterring publication 232 has been overridden by the concept that all
restraints on protected pure speech are transparently invalid and
therefore can be violated.23 3 Thus, in the unique case where a prior
restraint would be both necessary and constitutional,234 the
government and the people of the United States would have no course
of action to stop such a publication.23 5
A. PriorRestraints on Protected Pure Speech Are Inherently
TransparentlyInvalid
For a number of reasons, the collateral bar rule has rendered prior
restraints impotent as a deterrent to those who are enjoined from
publishing materials. First, the issuance of a prior restraint is a less
effective deterrent than a statute prohibiting speech.236 Second, the

transparently invalid exception to prior restraints is extremely difficult

to define.237 Most importantly, through the development of the case
law, the transparently invalid exception to the collateral bar rule has

230. But see N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (recognizing
that situations exist that would render a prior restraint valid); Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
231. See generally N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714; Near, 283 U.S. at 701; In re
Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979); see also supra Part I.B.2.
232. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 74, at 8; see also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002)
(seeking an injunction to prevent the withdrawal of prison privileges); Federal
Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999) (seeking injunction to
prevent a scheduled execution).
233. See infra Part III.
234. The commentators and the case law presume such a case exists. See N.Y.
Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (recognizing that situations exist that would render a prior
restraint valid); Walker, 388 U.S. at 320-21; Near, 283 U.S. at 701; Schenck, 249 U.S. at
52; see also Blackstone, supra note 34, at *152; Emerson, supra note 1, at 648; Jeffries,
supra note 4, at 412; Wells, supra note 30, at 7.
235. See generally N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714; Near, 283 U.S. at 701; Providence
Journal,820 F.2d at 1345; Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 994-96. See also supra Part
I.B.2.
236. See infra notes 239-41 and accompanying text.
237. See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
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eliminated the ability to enforce a prior restraint on protected pure
speech. 38
The timing of a prior restraint as compared to a subsequent
punishment seemingly provides evidence supporting the proposition
that prior restraints have a greater impact on deterring speech than a
statute. 23 9 However, due to the mechanics involved in issuing an
injunction, a statute that provides for subsequent punishment actually
has a greater effect of deterring speech than does an injunction. A
prior restraint only occurs when an injunction is issued.240 Unless a
publisher decides not to publish the entire story or decides to release
the topic prior to publication, an injunction cannot be issued.2 4 1 Thus,
the deterrent effect of injunctive relief is limited to situations where a
publisher affords the opportunity for an injunction to be issued.
Contrarily, a statute will have a strong deterrent effect because it will
remain in place and attach to all publications. Courts readily admit
24 2
that what is not and is transparently invalid is difficult to determine.
Presumably, publishers could use this as an excuse to publish articles
despite an injunction being issued against them. Therefore, the
deterrent effect of the collateral bar rule is further weakened.
Because the Supreme Court has never upheld a prior restraint on
protected pure speech, it is submitted that, by definition, a prior
restraint on "protected pure speech" is transparently invalid. Thus,
every injunction of protected pure speech can be violated without
implicating the consequences associated with the collateral bar rule.
Accordingly, because of the transparently invalid exception, the
collateral bar rule ceases to exist when protected pure speech is at
issue.
Many may find this result appealing.
The early English law
dictating administrative preclearance was abandoned due to the
detrimental effect of such restraints.2 43 Blackstone, one of the first
commentators to address the issue, renounced prior restraints as an
inhibitor to freedom in general.2 4 Moreover, the case law in the
United States, dating back to the Supreme Court's original decision in
238. See infra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
239. See supra Part I.A.4.
240. Compare Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), with
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
241. See Powe, supra note 152, at 70. In New York Times Co. v. United States, the
publisher made a conscious decision not to publish all of the Pentagon Papers at once.
Id. at 55. Likewise, in Progressive the editor decided that a confrontation with the
government would be of greater benefit than the immediate publication of the article.
Id. at 70. In either case, the publisher could have easily avoided any restraint due to
an injunction. Id. at 57.
242. In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1347 (1st Cir. 1986).
243. See supra Part I.A.1.
244. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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Near v. Minnesota, has been highly critical of prior restraints.24 5
Essentially, prior restraints restrict a constitutionally given right to
free speech.246 Commentators, like 2the
courts, have been highly
47
critical of the system of prior restraints.
Therefore, assuming situations do exist that would warrant
restrictions, the government has run into a predicament.
The
evolution of the collateral bar rule, mainly the exception allowing
violation of transparently invalid orders, has left a void. 24 No longer
can the government rely on the mechanism of prior restraint to
restrict protected pure speech that it deems a threat to national
security.2 49
B. Solutions for Repairing a Flawed Doctrine
It is clear that the law of prior restraints as it now exists, cannot
fulfill the needs it was originally instituted to satisfy.
The
government and the courts have three options to resolve this problem.
First, the collateral bar rule could be maintained without the
transparently invalid exception.
Second, the doctrine of prior
restraints could be modified. Lastly, the collateral bar rule could be
left as it is, 251 and the government could instead rely on statutory law
to restrict speech, prohibiting certain kinds of speech and stiffening
post-publication punishment for violating the prohibitions.
1. Elimination of the "Transparently Invalid" Exception
Keeping the collateral bar rule and eliminating the transparently
invalid exception legitimately responds to the development of the law.
It is clear that while the Supreme Court is reluctant to enjoin
protected pure speech prior to its publication, it is also clear that pure
speech exists that could be validly enjoined.2 52 By eliminating the
245. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
246. Because the constitutional right at issue is speech, a whole new set of
considerations arises. The publication of an article is often time sensitive. Thus, if a
prior restraint prohibits publication, the article may become worthless to the
publisher, making the prior restraint particularly injurious.
247. See Blasi, supra note 70, at 1482-83; Emerson, supra note 1, at 648.
248. See supra Part II.
249. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Part II.
251. As has been detailed, this would be equivalent to abandoning the collateral
bar rule, because its purpose has been totally undermined by the transparently invalid
exception.
252. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); see also In re
Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Progressive,
Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979); Blackstone, supra note 34, at *152; Emerson,
supra note 1, at 648.
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transparently invalid exception to the collateral bar rule, the courts
could reinstate the deterrent effect that the collateral bar rule is

supposed to serve. In doing so, however, the courts would once again
retain an unbridled power to impose these injunctions.253 Moreover, a
prior restraint may be difficult to obtain. If publication occurs without
any warning to the government, the imposition of an injunction will be
impossible. Therefore, the deterrent effect of the prior restraint and
the collateral bar rule can easily be circumvented by a publisher.

4

The collateral bar rule in the absence of the transparently invalid
exception would certainly be an improvement; moving the law in this

direction will put some teeth back into prior restraints. Further, it is
not likely that this resolution would sufficiently protect citizens'
constitutional rights, nor would it adequately protect their security.
2. Modification of Existing Law

As for the second solution, softening the doctrine of prior restraints
would essentially mean undoing years of case law. As it currently
stands, there is a strong presumption that a prior restraint on speech is

unconstitutional,

and

an

even

stronger

presumption

of

unconstitutionality when that speech is pure.255 This presumption has
been bolstered by language that dictates a publication must "surely
256
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation
and "inevitably, directly, and immediately" cause an event imperiling

safety to justify an injunction.

7

Weakening the presumption against

prior restraints would have a significant impact.
First, it would give the transparently invalid exception validity.
Language such as "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
damage" is insurmountable, but if the Court recognized that
injunctions could be issued only when "direct" and "irreparable"

damage to the nation may occur, the specter of unconstitutionality
would be diminished.2

8

Thus, the conclusion reached earlier that all

253. One common example is the following: A judge seeking re-election imposes
an injunction prohibiting publication of materials that would endorse his opponent.
While there is no doubt this type of behavior would be reprehensible and the
injunction would be overturned on appeal, the damage would have already been
done. The election would have passed, and the news would no longer be relevant.
See Labunski, supra note 98, at 375.
254. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
256. N.Y.Times, 403 U.S. at 730.
257. Id. at 726-27.
258. This is a very subtle shift in the language, but would likely have a significant
impact. Commentators on Progressivenoted that the term "immediate" likely would
have held back an injunction on the publication of material detailing how to construct
a hydrogen bomb. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. A more drastic
approach would be to view prior restraints in a medium similar to the test set forth in
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prior restraints on pure speech are inherently transparently invalid
would become false. If not all injunctions on pure speech were
inherently transparently invalid, then the collateral bar rule would
maintain its power as a deterrent, and would no longer be obsolete.
This is an attractive way to reinstate the collateral bar rule while
maintaining a check on the judiciary's power to impose injunctions.
The drawbacks to this approach, however, are monumental. First,
such an approach would require undoing years of case law and
overcoming extreme anti-prior restraint sentiment. This may be
impossible.
Second,
weakening
the
presumption
of
unconstitutionality arguably weakens constitutional rights. Finally,
the government's ostensible goal of deterrence would be lost in this
approach because injunctions are easily circumvented." 9
3. The Use of Statute
The last solution offered to fill the void left by the collateral bar
rule is to retain the collateral bar rule in its current form, and instead
to rely on statutory law to restrict speech. Statutes could prohibit
speech on certain topics and provide stiff subsequent punishment to
those who violate the prohibitions. This solution seemingly satisfies
both First Amendment activists and those within the government who
have a growing concern about the publication of sensitive materials.
As noted, prior restraints are easily circumvented, as is the
deterrent effect incorporated in the collateral bar rule. Statutes,
however, can serve as a deterrent before publication takes place
without "freezing" speech.26 ° The government may restrict speech on
topics that it feels are detrimental to national security. If the
publisher believes the statute is overly inclusive or otherwise
unconstitutional, he may violate it and challenge the merits later.2 1
Moreover, reliance on statutes permits First Amendment
jurisprudence to be tailored to the specific needs of the nation at
specific times.2 62
The possibility, however, of using a statutory framework to fill this
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). While this approach would also diminish
the specter of unconstitutionality looming over prior restraints, it would suffer from
the same drawbacks as a more subtle shift.
259. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
260. The speech prohibited by a statute would be unprotected. Thus, a prior
restraint on this type of speech will no longer be inherently transparently invalid.
This permits the courts to effectively use the current system of prior restraints. See
supra Part I.B.2.
261. See supra Part I.A.4.
262. This moves the system closer to the decision reached in Schenck, where the
Court reasoned that whether the speech should be enjoined depends on the current
state of affairs. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also supra
note 165.
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void is extremely minimal. The difficulty of this approach comes not
only in drafting a statute, but in administering it.263 One possible
statute may read as follows:
During any national emergency resulting from a war to which the
United States is a party, or from threat of such a war, the President
may, by proclamation, declare the existence of such emergency and,
by proclamation, prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or
the attempting to publish or communicate any information relating
to the national defense which, in his judgment, is of such character
that it is or might be useful to the enemy.
Critics will argue that Congress has already rejected this
hypothetical statute. 265 During the Congressional hearings on the
matter one of the main objections concerned whether Congress had
the power to enact a law that the President has absolute discretion to
implement.2 66 Arguments for and against its constitutionality were
made during the hearings, and the issue seemed unresolved.2 67 Such
uncertainty, among other issues, casts doubt on the constitutionality of
this statute.
Another possible statute could be more closely modeled after 18
U.S.C. § 793(e), which targets those

263. See infra Part III.3.A.
264. 55 Cong. Rec. S1763 (daily ed. May 3, 1917).
265. 55 Cong. Rec. 2167 (daily ed. May 12, 1917).
266. See supra note 265.
267. Though the issue remained unresolved during the congressional debates, the
case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer sheds light on the dilemma. 343 U.S.
579 (1952). In Youngstown, the Court examined the inherent powers of the
President. Justice Jackson's concurrence, which became accepted as the rule of law,
developed three categories of presidential action, according to the level of support the
President garnered from Congress. Id. at 634. Presidential action falls into a
particular category based on the level of support the President garnered from
Congress. The categories determine whether the President acted within his inherent
constitutional powers.
The first category states that when "the President acts pursuant to an express
or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum." Id. at 635.
The second is an intermediate category, and requires "when the President acts in
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon
his own independent power." Id. at 637. The last category grants the least amount of
power to the President, and occurs when "the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress." Id.
Using Justice Jackson's Youngstown categories would lead to the conclusion
that the President would be acting within his powers if he were to act pursuant to the
express authorization by Congress and prohibit publication. However, some continue
to argue that the Youngstown categories relate to foreign affairs only, and thus, this
line of reasoning would spark two additional debates: first, whether Youngstown only
applies to foreign affairs, and second, whether censuring domestic publication to stop
domestic terror attacks by foreign terrorist cells constitutes a foreign affair. These
issues will remain unresolved by this Note.
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having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any
document, [or] writing, ... relating to the national defense, or
information relating to the national defense which information the
possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the
United States. .. willfully communicates, delivers, transmits
[publishes] or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted
[published] or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit, [publish]
or cause to be communicated, delivered, transmitted, [or published]
the same to any person not entitled to receive it ... 268
However, drafting the statute in this manner would limit flexibility.
Moreover, the statute has already been drafted and subsequently
interpreted not to include "publications," thus it would be difficult to
insert such language and have the statute pass constitutional muster.
i. Scenarios One and Two: Application
The proposed statute is easily applied to Scenario One. President
Bush has "proclaimed" that there is a "national emergency" and that
the nation is currently fighting a "war" on terror. The issue stems
from the subjective determination that the President is called on to
make.
The publication of CIA operatives' names and the details of special
operations the CIA is involved in clearly are "of such a character that
is or might be useful to the enemy." There is little doubt that if the
President proclaimed such publications illegal under the proposed
statute his subjective determination would stand up to the strictest
scrutiny. The scenario, however, is similar to the situation in Near and
therefore would likely be subject to restriction via prior restraints.
Scenario Two presents a more difficult subjective determination for
the President. The key language in the statute proposed is "might be
useful to the enemy." This calls for a subjective determination that
will inevitably wear at the nation's First Amendment rights.
Though the statutes would be extremely narrowly tailored, they
simply pose too large a risk to the central tenets upon which the
nation was founded.

268. The Actual text of the statute reads:
Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any
document, writing,.., relating to the national defense, or information
relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason
to believe could be used to the injury of the United States... willfully
communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered,
or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled
to receive it,... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2003).
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CONCLUSION

Seemingly, the current state of law concerning prior restraints is in
harmony. There is a strong presumption against prior restraints in all
situations, and an even a stronger presumption that a prior restraint
on pure speech is unconstitutional. Thus, having a collateral bar rule
that allows for the violation of a transparently invalid prior restraint
Courts and commentators,
without repercussion makes sense.
however, have not foreclosed the possibility of a valid restraint on
pure speech. Thus, the absence of viable prior restraints has left a
void. Despite the heavy presumption against prior restraints, the
flawed transparently invalid distinction, and the significant threat to
the United States, reactionary legislation and judicial holdings that
may impair the nation's constitutional rights are not the answer.
Though the solutions proposed certainly offer options, none has the
capability of filling the void while at the same time maintaining the
necessary constitutional protections. As a result, the issue will remain
largely unresolved. The nation and its security must rely on the
current law, as well as responsible reporting, as protection against the
evils that may arise from the publication of sensitive security
materials.
In an era where national safety is of the utmost importance, the law
regarding restrictions on publications needs review. No solution will
simultaneously afford maximum protection of national security and of
Relying on prior restraints, however, has
constitutional rights.
become impossible due to the development of the case law.
Therefore a move toward a statutory based restriction system could
resolve many of the current problems. Regardless of which system is
utilized, it will be difficult to maintain the necessary balance between
constitutional rights and national security, as both interests are
tremendously important.

